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Comments and Casenotes
"Gross Receipts" Apportionment Formula In State
Taxation Of Foreign Corporation Operating
Partly Through Subsidiaries
Household Finance Corp. v. State Tax Commission1
In 1953, Household Finance Corporation, a foreign
finance corporation, was engaged in a nation-wide small
loan business. Although the corporation itself did busi-
ness in Maryland, a part of its out-of-state operations was
conducted through ten wholly owned subsidiaries. Mary-
land imposes an annual tax on "[s]o much of the capital
stock of foreign finance corporations doing business in
Maryland as represents the business done in this State...,"
The State Tax Commission is directed to determine the
total value of all the capital stock of such a company." It
next must allocate to Maryland that portion of this total
value as fairly represents the business done in Maryland.
The statute provides that:
".... in apportioning the value of the shares between
the business within and without Maryland, it shall be
presumed in the absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary that the value of the property and business with-
in Maryland bears to the value of the total business
and property the same ratio which the gross receipts
or earnings in Maryland . . . bears to the total gross
receipts of earnings . . ."4
In the year 1953, the Commission arrived at $163,262,300
as the total value of all the stock. In order to allocate to
Maryland its proper portion of this valuation, the Commis-
sion multiplied it by a fraction the numerator of which was
the gross receipts of Household in Maryland ($2,481,626),
and the denominator of which was the total gross receipts
of Household everywhere ($61,812,951). This last figure
was not the gross receipts of Household and all its sub-
sidiaries figured on a consolidated basis ($75,000,000); it
1 212 Md. 80, 128 A. 2d 640 (1957).
2 MD. CODE (1951), Art. 81, sec. 7 (7).8 Tbid, Art. 81, secs. 20(a), 20(b), 19(a).
'Ibid, Art. 81, sec. 20(a). Omitted from the quotation of the statutory
language are several references to the treatment of income from permanent
investments which were not material In the instant case.
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was the gross receipts of the parent corporation alone. The
result of this multiplication was a figure of about $6,500,000,
which was the Commission's assessment of the value of
that part of the capital stock of Household that represented
"the business done in Maryland". Household appealed to
the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, claiming, inter alia,
that the failure of the Commission's gross receipts fraction
to include in its denominator consolidated gross receipts
of the parent and the subsidiaries necessarily resulted in a
larger portion of the total capital stock being attributed to
Maryland than should have been, and that the tax was in-
valid because it was not imposed in accordance with the
Maryland statutory language and because it accomplished
the taxation of extra territorial values in violation of the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Circuit Court found for
Household. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed, Judges Hammond and Henderson dissenting.
The majority opinion written by Judge Prescott ex-
plains the holding as follows:
".... if the Commission sees fit to arrive at the total
value of a unitary enterprise on a consolidated basis, it
cannot in fairness apportion that value as between
Maryland and other jurisdictions on a basis which is
inconsistent with, and which rejects, an element used
in building up that value. Here, of course, that element
is the earnings of the subsidiaries. They have been dis-
carded and the gross earnings of the parent company
only have been used for the apportionment.
"We have reached the conclusion above stated on
the basis of our statute, and we have not found it neces-
sary to seek to determine the limit of the constitutional
power of the State in imposing or apportioning a tax
such as that here involved."
'5
Judge Hammond in his dissenting opinion6 disputed the
Court's holding that the Commission's use of the apportion-
ing formula was at odds with the statutory directive that
"it shall be presumed in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary that the value of the property and business
within Maryland bears to the value of total business and
property the same ratio which gross receipts or earnings in
Maryland .. .bears to the total gross receipts of earn-
5 Supra, n. 1, 98.
6 Supra, n. 1, di8. op. 99, In which Judge Henderson concurred.
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ings.. ."' He presented various comparative financial data
to support his belief that this presumption was justified in
this instance.' It is interesting that nowhere in the ma-
jority opinion was there presented any factual evidence in
the nature of operating or financial statistics to refute the
presumption in the statute. The Court relied on the fact
that:
"The result has been to produce a considerably
larger apportionment of value to Maryland than would
have been reached if the gross earnings of subsidi-
aries, ... had been used in determining the ratio of
gross receipts in Maryland to gross receipts outside of
Maryland."
This fact is indisputable, but does it per se establish that
the statutory formula used by the Commission imputes to
Maryland a higher percentage of the value of Household's
total business than actually belongs here? Or, should the
presumption be discarded only when concrete facts and
figures are submitted proving that the presumption is fac-
tually incorrect in the particular case? This was the line
of cleavage between the members of the Court, and upon
this point the case was decided.
It was therefore unnecessary to examine the constitu-
tionality of the apportioning formula as applied to House-
hold, but this second aspect of the matter is of interest in
its own right and also to the extent that it reflects light on
the initial problem of statutory interpretation. The con-
stitutional doctrine here applicable seems to be that any
statutory formula reasonable on its face (as is the one in
the instant case)' ° is valid and constitutional unless it is
Supra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 6, 104. For instance, consolidated net income of Household
everywhere was 43.3% of consolidated gross income, but Maryland net in-
come was 50% of Maryland gross. Each dollar of consolidated assets pro-
duced 9 cents of net income; each dollar of Maryland assets produced 12
cents. Maryland assets comprised only 2.8% of consolidated assets but
produced 3.81% of consolidated net Income. Judge Hammond argued from
these figures that the Maryland business of Household had a relatively
higher "going concern" value than Household's average business and con-
cluded that the figure of $6,500,000 (about 4% of the value of Household's
entire property and business) was perfectly reasonable as a proper evalu-
ation of the Household property and business in Maryland.
9 Supra, n. 1, 98.
a The fact that In the case of a unitary enterprise, property outside of
the taxing state may be taken into consideration in order to arrive at a
value of the taxable property within the state has long been well settled.
"The only reason for allowing a State to look 'beyond its borders
when it taxes the property of foreign corporations is that it may get
'the true value of the things within it, when they are part of an organic
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shown by clear and cogent evidence that the formula pro-
duces "a palpably disproportionate result"." In other
words, there is a presumption of constitutionality which
can be rebutted only by clear evidence that values outside
the state are being taxed in the present instance. It is
apparent that this constitutional presumption and the statu-
tory presumption in Sec. 20(a) are very nearly identical. 2
Hence, it would appear that the same considerations used
in determining when this presumption of constitutionality
breaks down would be helpful also in determining when
the statutory presumption in Sec. 20(a) is invalid. And, of
course, the most important consideration that concerns us
is what is meant by "clear and cogent evidence".
There is an astonishing lack of direct authority on the
problem posed by the fact situation in the instant case. In
one of the few similar cases, People v. Knapp," Judge Car-
dozo sitting on the Court of Appeals of New York, was
asked to rule upon the validity of a franchise 4 tax imposed
system of wide extent, that gives them a value above what they other-
wise would possess."
Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69 (1920).
The Maryland Court of Appeals had no difficulty at all in finding that
Household was engaged in such a unitary enterprise.
"... Through the operation of Its headquarters, and the combined
borrowing power . . ., the most advantageous rates of interest may be
attained with resultant benefit to all parts of the corporate body. The
branches in Maryland, . . . contributed to the whole; and, naturally,
obtained many benefits therefrom."
212 Md. 80, 95, 128 A. 2d 640 (1957).
2N. & W. Ry. Co. v. N. Carolina, 297 U. S. 682, 688 (1936) ; Harvester
Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 422 (1947).
"This should not be surprising because undoubtedly the statutory pre-
sumption was created and designed among other reasons to minimize the
possibility of unconstitutional applications in particular cases.
"230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202 (1920).
u It may be well at this point to consider the nature of the tax Imposed
on foreign finance corporations by Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, sec. 20(a), (b).
There are two broad classifications in the area of state taxation of foreign
corporations: (1) "property" taxes and (2) all the various other types,
which can be lumped together under the term "excise" taxes. Property
taxes are subject to the constitutional requirements of uniformity of taxa-
tion and the requirement of taxation according to value, whereas the excise
taxes are not. See 14 FLErcHiER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATONS (Perm. ed., 1945),
§6902. On the other hand, sometimes an excise tax will fail when, if It
had been deemed to be a property tax, it would have been sustained. See
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U. S. 359 (1954), where the Court
decided that the tax was not a property tax and hence was void as a
privilege tax Imposed on the privilege of doing Interstate business.
Often it is difficult to determine in which category a particular Income,
franchise, license, privilege, or other tax belongs. The distinction is often
very subtle. For instance, it Is settled that It Is beyond a state's power to
tax the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce; yet taxes can validly
be levied on property used in interstate commerce, e.g., see Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (1897).
It would appear that the Maryland tax concerned here is a property tax.
It is listed as such in the statute itself, and is clearly designed to operate
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on that part of a foreign corporation's net income which was
attributed to New York by the following statutory formula.
Its net income was to be multiplied by a fraction the numer-
ator of which consisted of the monetary value of certain of
its assets located in New York, and the denominator of
which consisted of the total value of these types of assets
wherever situated. The resulting figure was taxable in
New York. It happened that a substantial part of the tax-
payer's net income derived from bonds held outside New
York and that the value of bonds held by the corporation
was not includable in either numerator or denominator of
the apportioning fraction. The Court held that the tax was
bad on constitutional grounds. 5 It made no finding that
the actual result was disproportionate or excessive. For all
that appears the formula may have attributed a smaller
percentage of the entire net income to New York than was
in fact earned there. However, under the circumstances of
the case the formula was bad in theory and was therefore
rejected without further ado.'6
However, other cases in which taxes of this sort have
been struck down have emphasized and relied on the fac-
as a tax on the value of the business in Maryland; Art. 81, Sec. 7(7). Also,
the tangible personal property of the taxpayer is exempt from the ordinary
tax imposed on such personalty; Sec. 8(14). Likewise the assessed value
of realty owned by such a corporation is to be subtracted from the value
of the tax base (total capital stock) before the tax is assessed; Sec. 19(b).
These provisions evidence a legislative intent not to tax the corporation's
physical property twice and to this extent indicate that the tax is a prop-
erty tax. The problem was touched upon, but not decided, in Commercial
Corp. v. Tax Comm., 181 Md. 234, 239, 29 A. 2d 294 (1942), where the Court
mentioned in passing the Commission's contention that the tax was not on
the property of the corporation but on the privilege of doing business in
the state (which would make it an excise tax).
1Supra, n. 13, 206.
"Here, . . . the statute prescribes a rule of allocation which, as
applied to foreign corporations holding bonds . . . in other states, in-
volves an artificial and arbitrary augmentation of the value of the
local privilege. It measures -the value of the franchise, here and else-
where, by income from all sources, and excludes some of the same
sources when the value is apportioned. To take from assets elsewhere
is equivalent to adding to assets here."
16 Certiorari to the U. S. Supreme Court was denied; 256 U. S. 702 (1921).
Judge Cardozo cited and relied heavily on Oklahoma v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
223 U. S. 298 (1912). In this case the tax was Imposed on that part of the
gross receipts of an express company which were apportioned to Oklahoma
by the use of a fraction, the numerator of which was "business done" in
Oklahoma and the denominator of which was "business done" everywhere.
Apparently substantial Income was realized from bonds and land outside
of Oklahoma. This Income was included in the measure of the tax, i.e., the
total gross receipts, but was excluded from the denominator of the appor-
tioning fraction, evidently on the theory that it was not a part of the
"business done" by the company. Judge Cardozo said of 'this case:
"The scheme of allocation limited the assessors to the comparison
of the receipts of business done within the state with the receipts of
business there and elsewhere. Investments in bonds and lands were
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tual showing of a disproportionate result effected in the in-
dividual instance. Fargo v. Hart17 is an early leading case
which condemned a property tax on the assets of an express
company apportioned by using a mileage ratio (number
of miles of track within the state to total miles every-
where), because the allocation fraction imputed much more
property to the taxing state than was actually in the state.
The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes cited fac-
tual evidence to prove that the result reached was errone-
ous; e.g., the total assets of the company were valued at
$22,000,000; those situated in the taxing state at $8,000. But
the worth of the latter was assessed at $800,000 by the oper-
ation of the statutory formula. 8 Wallace v. Hines," a later
case, made a similar holding. Another case" struck down
a tax on freight cars produced by an apportionment formula
which attributed a daily average of over 400 freight cars
to the taxing state; the taxpayer proved by its figures that
the actual daily average was 57 cars. In the celebrated
Hans Rees case,2' the Court condemned the tax on a show-
ing that the allocation formula allotted 80% of total income
disregarded in the apportionment, though the income from such in-
vestments was included in the measure. On that ground, as well as on
others, the statute was held invalid."
Supra, n. 13, 206. There is little doubt that the case was authority for the
proposition made out for it by Judge Cardozo, but it seems to have lost its
vitality in this regard because it has never since been cited for this purpose,
but has repeatedly been used as authority for its other entirely distinct doc-
trine that a state tax on the gross receipts of interstate business is viola-
tive of the "commerce clause" of Article 1, §8 of the U. S. Constitution. See,
for example, Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922) ; Matson
Nay. Co. v. State Board, 297 U. S. 444 (1936); McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940) ; Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S.
292 (1944).
In a later case involving the same New York statute under very similar
factual circumstances, the Supreme Court rejected a demand for the
application of the doctrine in the Knapp case and sustained the tax. It
relied partially, however, on the fact that the issue had not been raised in
the lower court. Bass, etc., Ltd. v. Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 271 (1924).
11193 U. S. 490 (1904).
18 The Court also based its decision on the impropriety of including in the
measure of the tax (gross assets) investments which had nothing to do
with the running of the business in the taxing state, i.e., it made the point
that when a business is not entirely unitary in its nature, that part of it
which differs from the business carried on within the taxing state should
not be considered in determining the value of the business in the taxing
state.
19Supra, n. 10. Here, a North Dakota excise tax was imposed on that
part of a railroad's capital that was used In the state. Again, the appor-
tioning formula was a track mileage fraction, and again, the actual facts
of the case indicated that the result of the statutory formula was erroneous.
It was shown that the very valuable terminals of the railroad were in other
states and that in North Dakota there were for the most part only long
stretches of track running through sparsely populated territory.
"D Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919).21 Hans Rees' Sons v. No. Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
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to North Carolina, while the evidence showed that only
17% of it was in fact derived from operations in that state.
In all these cases the statutory formula was constitutional
on its face and the Court in voiding the tax relied to a
greater or lesser degree on evidence that the actual result
of the allocation formula (without regard to the theory of
its composition and computation) was erroneous and unfair.
There are a number of decisions indicating that the
theory of the allocating formula is immaterial if the result
produced by it is in line with the realities of the situation.22
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. North Carolina," is a
very significant case. There North Carolina sought to tax
that part of an interstate railroad's net income that was
attributable to the state. The statute required that the
average gross income per mile of system track be computed
and that North Carolina's share be assigned on the basis
of the number of miles of track located in that state. The
same procedure was to be followed in allocating to the state
its portion of total operating expenses. The expenses at-
tributable to North Carolina then were to be subtracted
from the gross income allocated to it and the resulting
figure was to be the net income taxable in North Carolina.
The railroad sought to have the tax voided on the ground
that its actual operating expenses were substantially
greater than the expenses attributed to it by the statutory
formula. Proof was submitted which left little question
of this fact. Nevertheless, the Court sustained the tax. It
reasoned that there was a possibility that the operation of
2 "However, it is apparent from the result reached that we cannot say the
evidence of the plaintiff clearly and convincingly shows the method used
by the commission is In error, ..."
Knappton Towboat Company v. Chambers, 202 Or. 618, 276 P. 2d
425, 429 (1954). (Emphasis supplied.)
"The method or formula used by the taxing authorities . . . is not
disclosed. This we do not regard as of controlling importance. If the
result arrived at was clearly within the permissive limits of their dis-
cretion, the particular method used would seem unimportant."
Bailey v. Megan, 102 F. 2d 651, 654 (8th Cir., 1939).
The question lies solely in the result, which must not culminate
in gross injustice or over-assessment."
Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Brown, 32 F. Supp. 784, 792
(E. D. Mich., 1940).
See also Pacific Fruit Express Co. v. McColgan, 67 Cal. App. 2d 93, 153
P. 2d 607, 612 (1944), where the Court conceded that the Commissioner's
application of the allocating formula was in error, but refused to give the
taxpayer any relief because the taxpayer:
"... failed to show that the formula applied resulted in the payment
of more taxes than in equity and good conscience it should have paid,
or that under the formula applied it had paid a tax measured by more
than the amount of net income reasonably and fairly attributable to
the business done in the state."
2297 U. S. 682 (1936).
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the formula attributed to North Carolina less gross income
than was in fact derived from that state and therefore there
might have been a compensating error which would save
the final result. 4 The Norfolk & Western case holds firmly
and explicitly that the taxpayer must prove that the final
net result of the allocation formula is wrong, and failing
this, he cannot rely on defects or flaws inherent in the
formula to save him.25 And it seems to be established that
in the case of an unitary enterprise it is very difficult to
satisfy the court that the assessment is too high, that the
result produced by the formula is arbitrary and unfair.
Consider, for example, Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp,26
upholding a franchise tax formula which attributed
$23,000,000 of capital stock to the taxing state in spite of
the fact that the company had tangible assets in that state
in the value of only $3,000,000. Other cases hold similarly
in analogous circumstances.
One Pennsylvania case 28 dealt tangentially with the very
problem in the instant case. The Court sustained the tax;
it was not impressed by the argument that the gross re-
ceipts of the subsidiaries should be included in the denomi-
nator of the allocating fraction.29
It would seem that the courts have indicated that the
net product of the formula is what counts, not its theoretical
26 "For all that appears in the case developed by the Railway, actual
gross revenues in North Carolina may have been so far in excess of
average gross revenues computed under the statute as to neutralize the
discrepancy between actual and average cost of operation. If such a
counter balance exists, appellant has not been injured through the
application of the formula."
"We must bear in mind steadily that the burden is on the taxpayer
to make oppression manifest by clear and cogent evidence."
Ibid, 686, 688.
Justice Cardozo asked:
"Would it have had to pay less if net income had been ascertained
without reference to mileage? Would the difference have been so great
as to overpass the bounds of reason? In the evidence for the railway,
there is no answer to those questions .... the state in presenting com-
putations did not lift the burden from the railway of satisfying the
court, after all the evidence was in, that it was a victim of oppression."
Supra, n. 23, 688-9.
308 U. S. 331 (1939). The Court says at page 336:
"In a unitary enterprise, property outside the state, when correlated
in use with property within the state, necessarily affects the worth of
the privilege within the state. . . . The weight, . . . given the property
beyond the state boundaries is but a recognition of the very real effect
its existence has upon the value of the privilege granted within the
taxing state."
Underwood T'writer Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920) ; Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937) ; Butler Bros. v. McColgan,
315 U. S. 501 (1942).
21 Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 38 A. 2d 329 (1944).
Ibtd, 334.
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imperfections." Perhaps this approach has merit also in
construing these statutes. If so, a statutory presumption
that "the value of the property and business within Mary-
land bears to the value of the total business and property
the same ratio which the gross receipts . . . in Maryland
bears to the total gross receipts.. ." should not be cast aside
in the absence of clear factual evidence that it is wrong.
P. McEvoY CROMWELL
8 See also Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 422 (1947), where the
Court said:
"Unless a palpably disproportionate result comes down from an
apportionment . . . this Court has not been willing to nullify honest
state efforts to make apportionments."
And Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 296 (1922):
"If this same amount of tax had been imposed ... without reference
being made to the basis of its computation, very certainly no objec-
tion to its validity would have been thought of."
Cf. State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940), where
the Court said:
"The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not demand of states
strict observance of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing
in their exercise of the most basic power of government, that of taxa-
tion. For constitutional purposes the decisive issue turns on the operat-
ing incidence of a challenged tax. A state is free to pursue its own
fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical
operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to oppor-
tunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to
benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized
society."
